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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMY P. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case
No. 8727

-vs.-

WILLIAM T. MAYNARD,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries suffered by
Mrs. Amy P. Johnson when her automobile was struck
broadside by a vehicle being driven by William T. Maynard. A jury returned a verdict of ''no cause of action.''
The questions presented on appeal involve primarily the
standard of care required of the driver of an authorized
emergency vehicle.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case arose out of a traffic accident which took
place during the noon hour (12 :18 p.m.) on the 21st day
1
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of November, 1955, at the intersection of 27th Street and
Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah, between an automobile being driven by Johnson and an Ogden City police
vehicle (an emergency vehicle) being driven by Maynard,
a police officer of Ogden City. (T-11, 32, 56, 81, 134, 143)
The police vehicle driven by Maynard was equipped
with a revolving red light, mounted on the top of the
vehicle, which was flashing prior to the accident (T-104),
and a siren, which was mounted on the left front fender.
The siren was operated by a button located near the
clutch pedal. (T-26, 30, 31, 332, 347, 351)
At the time in question, Maynard had been on shift
as a police officer for approximately four hours (T-42). It
had been raining during that entire four-hour period
(T-42), and was still raining at the time of the accident
(T-112). The streets were wet (T-28). Maynard was
using the windshield wipers on the police vehicle (T-28),
and was of the opinion that motorists would have their
\vindows closed and that hearing and visibility would be
somewhat impaired (T-28, 29, 51, 72).
The intersection of 27th Street and Washington
Boulevard is in the business district of Ogden City
(T-32), there is an apartment house on the southwest
corner ( T -33), during the noon hour traffic increases
(T-33), and Maynard knew that it was a rush hour (T-72).
Prior to the accident, Johnson had been driving her
automobile in an easterly direction on 27th Street, approaeltillg- the intersection of 27th Street and \Yashington
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Boulevard, and Maynard had been driving the police
vehicle in a northerly direction along Washington Boulevard approaching first the intersection of 28th Street and
Washington Boulevard and subsequently the intersection
of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard. (R-1; T -43, 49)
Another traffic accident, not involved in this case,
took place in Ogden City just before the accident causing
the present dispute. According to Maynard's testimony,
as he was driving north on Washington Boulevard approaching the intersection of 28th Street and Washington Boulevard. He had been listening to the radio communications between the police dispatcher and other police officers concerning the first accident and was of the
opinion that he would be called to assist at its scene.
(T-49, 79, 80, 82, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90)
Maynard subsequently did receive a radio communication from the police dispatcher instructing him to assist
the traffic sergeant at the scene of the first accident. ( T -49,
79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 87' 88, 89, 90)
At the trial of the case Maynard testified that prior
to receiving the order to assist he was asked his location
by the police dispatcher at the time the police vehicle
he was driving was entering the intersection of 28th
Street and Washington Boulevard, proceeding north.
(T-44) In a deposition taken May 29, 1956, Maynard
testified that he gave the police dispatcher his location at
the time that the police vehicle he was driving was passing
through the intersection of 28th Street and Washington
Boulevard. (T-49, 49) At the trial of the case Maynard
3
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testified that in giving his location to the police dispatcher
he said that he was ''approaching 27th Street and Washington Boulevard.'' ( T -44)
The Fire Department of Ogden City maintains a
radio receiver which records all Police and Fire Department radio communications. (T-75, 76) The tape of the
radio transmissions between the police dispatcher and
Maynard indicates that the police dispatcher called car
No.2 (Maynard), that Maynard answered: "go ahead,"
that the police dispatcher then asked Maynard for his location, and that Maynard gave his location as" 27th and
Washington.'' The word ''approaching'' does not appear
on the tape. The police dispatcher then gave Maynard the
location of the traffic accident at which he was to assist,
Maynard acknowledged the order and engaged the siren,
which is audible for just a split second on the tape. (Exh.
B; T-79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90)
At the trial of the case :Maynard placed the point at
which he first engaged the siren as approximately 200
feet north of the intersection of 28th Street and TV askington Boulez·ard T-45), and at that time he identified the
point at which he first engaged the siren by placing a
rectangle with a "2'' inside it on Exhibit A. (T-51)
In his deposition .Jfaynard estimated that he first
engaged the siren approximately 150 feet south of the intersection of 27th Street and Trash iugton Boulevard.
(T-50)
At the trial l\faynard also testified that he took his
foot off the siren button to shift gears approximately
4
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220 feet south of the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard and then immediately re-engaged the
siren. (T-46, 47; Exh. A, rectangle with "1" inside;
T-341, 350)
Several witnesses were present in and about the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard before the siren was first audible. (T-113, 114, 117, 134) We
will note their testimony in the Argument.
Traffic moving through the intersection of 27th Street
and Washington Boulevard is controlled by a traffic semaphore. ( T -32) When Johnson entered the intersection
the light was in her favor, indicating "green" or "go"
for traffic passing through the intersection on 27th Street
and "red" or "stop" for traffic proceeding along Washington Boulevard. (T-136, 341, 354, 359, 363)
Johnson was traveling "not less than 5 miles per
hour but not more than 7 miles per hour'' as she proceeded through the intersection. (T-113, 114)

Maynard had accelerated continruous from a point approximately 220 feet south of the intersection, into the
intersection, and up to the point of impact. (T-53)
Approximately 30 feet before entering the intersection Maynard took his eyes off the road and looked at his
speedometer. According to his testimony he determined
that he was going 37 miles per hour at that time (T-359)

Maynard entered the intersection against the ''red''
or "stop" light. (T-136) He had known that the light
5
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would be ''red'' against him from the time he had crossed
the intersection of 28th Street a;n.d Washington Boulevard, and had observed that the light was" red" against
him on various occasions while traveling northward approaching 27th Street. (T-341, 354, 358, 359, 363)
Maynard did not see the Johnson automobile until the
Johnson automobile was only 4 feet in front of the police
vehicle. ( T -53, 363)
Maynard did not have an opportunity to apply his
brakes or otherwise attempt to avoid the accident. (T-53,
363) He drove the police vehicle into the right front door
post of the Johnson automobile. (T-143)
The point of impact took place just east of the center
of the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard, in the inside lane for traffic proceeding north on
Washington Boulevard. (T-15; Exh. A, rectangles by
traffic light at 27th and \\'" ashington)
Johnson suffered permanent brain and facial injuries as a result of the accident. {T-184, 270) Because of
the nature of her injuries she is unable to recall any of
the events leading up to the accident or the accident
itself. (T-326, 327)

ST.ATEl\IENT OF POINTS
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING

TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY. (T-371)
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2. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING, OVER THE
OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, INSTRUCTIONS. NUMBERS 5 AND 6
3. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF, THAT THE ONLY MEASURE OF CARE
REQUIRED OF THE DRIVER OF AN AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEffiCLE WAS TO
GIVE REASONABLE WARNING OF HIS APPROACH. (Instruction No.6)
4. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NUMBERS.
5. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NUMBERll.
6. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON "UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT,"
OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF.
7. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF, ON THE DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMPTION OF RISK."
8. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF AN "ACT OF GOD."

ARGUMENT
PoiNT

1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GRANT' PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY. (T-371)
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(A)

Maynard did not observe the sta;ndard
of care required of the driver of an
emergency vehicle.

It is our position that Maynard did not observe the
standard of care required of the driver of an emergency
vehicle, that he was therefore negligent as a matter of
law; that Johnson was not contributorily negligent; and
that, therefore, the court committed error in refusing to
grant Johnson's motion for a directed verdict on the
issue of liability.
The standard of care required of the driver of an
emergency vehicle is set forth in section 41-6-14, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. (Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on the Highways, as amended, 1955.) That
section grants drivers of emergency vehicles certain liberties not accorded other drivers, and also imposes certain requirements if those liberties are to be exercised.
This section of the code, as amended by the 1955 Legislature, is set forth here for the convenience of the court.
41-6-14.

Applicability and Exemptions.-

( a) The provisions of this act applicable to
the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall
apply to the driYers of all Yehirles owned or operated by the United States, this state or any county,
cit~~, district, or any other political subdidsion of
the state, including authorized emergency vehicles; provided, ho\\·eyer, that such authorized
emergency Ye hieles shall be exempt from the driving restrictions imposed under sections 41-6-20 to
and induding 4-1-6-28, 41-G-46 to and including
41-6-8:2 and 41-6-91 to and including 41-6-106 of
8
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this act when
conditions:

driven

under

the

following

(1) Said exemption shall apply whenever
any said vehicle is being driven in response to an
emergency call or when used in the pursuit of an
actual or suspected violator of the law, or when
responding to but not returning from a fire alarm.
(2) Said exemption herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when
the driver of any said vehicle while in motion
sounds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust
whistle as may be reasonably necessary, and when
the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted
lamp displaying a red light visible under normal
atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet
to the front of such vehicle.
(b) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions
protect the driver from the consequences of an
arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in
this section.
(c) .

"

The exemptions granted drivers of emergency vehicles are not stated in general terms, but are specifically
set forth by listing the specific code numbers of the sections of the Act which do not apply to drivers of such
vehicles. A summary of these exemptions is as follows :
Sections 41-6-20 through 41-6-28 govern traffic signs, signals and markings.
Sections 41-6-46 through 41-6-52 provide for
maximum and minimum speed limits.
9
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Sections 41-6-53 through 41-6-65 govern driving on the right side of the road, passing procedure, passing zones, traffic lanes, motor caravans
and limited access highways.
Sections 41-6-66 through 41-6-71 regulate the
signals to be given when turning, as well as turns
which are prohibited.
Sections 41-6-72 through 41-6-76 regulate
right of way among vehicles using the highways.
Sections 41-6-77 through 41-6-82 govern pedestrians on the highways.
Sections 41-6-91 through 41-6-94 regulate railroad crossings, trains and safety zones.
Sections 41-6-95 through 41-6-100 regulate
special stops.
Sections 41-6-101 through 41-6-104 govern
stopping, standing and parking on highways and
signs prohibiting the same.
Sections 41-6-105 through 41-6-106 regulate
unattended vehicles and backing on highways.
Thus, section 41-6-1-! by its express term serves to
relieve drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from
the duty to observe speed limits, heed traffic signals, stop
signs and parking regulations, to yield the right of way,
to drive on any specified side of the road, or to observe
nny particular turning procedure.
The language of the Legislature contains not the
~lightest suggestion of a legislative intent to excuse drivpr~ of emergency Yehicles from any duties required by
law, other than those specifically listed. A Carte Blanche
10
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is not given to the driver of such a vehicle to endanger
life and property merely because he happens to be on an
emergency call. His job is to assist in an emergency,
not create an emergency.
Thus, the exemptions listed are only granted subject
to sub-paragraph (8) of section 41-6-14, which, for emphasis, we repeat :

"The foregoing prov~swns shall not relieve the
driver of an a.uthorized emergency vehicle from
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons ... "
Emphasis was given to the foregoing provision when
it was re-stated in substance by the legislature in enacting
section 41-6-76 (the section governing the duty of drivers
<ilf other vehicles upon the approach of an emergency
vehicle complying with the audible and visual signals
required by the act). Paragraph (b) of section 41-6-76
provides as follows:

••This section shall not operate to relieve the
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons using the highway."
Also, section 41-6-14 does not exempt the driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the provisions of section 41-6-45, paragraph (a) of which provides as follows:

"Any person who drives any vehicle in wilful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property is guilty of reckless driving."
11
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In the case of Jensen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P.
2d 838, decided June 11, 1954, this court recognized that
the Legislature intended that drivers of emergency vehicles be required to exercise their exemptions with due
regard for the safety of all persons. In that case this
court said as follows:
''The Legislature likewise added this additional limitation on the exercise of the privilege
granted:
'' 'The foregoing provisions shall not relieve
the driver on an authorized emergency vehicle
from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions
protect the driver from the consequences of his
reckless disregard for the safety of others.'
''To adopt the view contended for by defendant would ignore completely the specific limitations placed by the Legislature on the driver of an
emergency vehicle.''
Section 41-6-14 was amended by the Legislature in
1955, enlarging somewhat the exemptions granted and
listing them by stating the specific statutes not applicable
to drivers of emergency vehicles. ( 41-6-1±, supra) HOWEVER, THE PROVISION CREATING THE DUTY TO
DRIVE WITH "DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY
OF ALL PERSONS" \YAS RE-ENACTED IN THE
STATUTE, AS AMENDED (supra), AXD \\AS ALSO
RE-ENACTED AS PAR.AGRAPH (b) OF SECTION
41-6-76 (supra).
We contend that l\Iaynard, judged solely by his own
testimony, did not operate the police Yehirle "u·ith due
12
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regard for the safety of all persons," in that he did not
keep a proper or any lookout for cars in the intersection
proceeding with a green light in their favor, and that he
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.

Maynard testified that at the time of the accident in
question it was raining (T-42, 112), that the streets were
wet (T-28), that he was using his windshield wipers
(T-28), that he thought other drivers would have their
windows closed, and that hearing and visibility would be
somewhat impaired. (T-28, 29, 51, 72)
He testified further that the intersection of 27th
Street and Washington Boulevard is in the business district of Ogden City (T-32), that traffic increases during
the noon hour (T-33), and that he knew it was a rush
hour. (T-72)
He also testified that he had known from the time he
crossed the intersection of 28th Street and Washington
Boulevard that the light would be "red" against him at
the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard, and that he had in fact observed that the light was
''red'' against him on several occasions while traveling
northward approaching 27th Street. (T-341, 354, 358,
359, 363)
Knowing the atmospheric conditions and the limitations on hearing and visibility, knowing that he was
going through the business district of Ogden City during a rush hour, and knowing that he was going to pass
through an intersection against the ''red'' light, Maynard nevertheless testified that he commenced accelerating
from a point approximately 220 feet south of that inter13
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section and accelerated continuously until he entered the
intersection and in fact until the moment of impact with
the Johnson automobile. (T-53)

Maynard also testified that he didn't even see the
Johnson automobile until it was too late to apply his
brakes. (T-53, 363)
Howard Clay observed the Johnson automobile in
the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard when Maynard was still approximately 176 feet
south of that intersection. (T-113, 114, 112) Clay also
observed that the Johnson automobile was traveling between 5 and 7 miles per hour. (T-113, 114)
Arthur Cox observed the Johnson automobile in the
center of the intersection of 27th Street and Washington
Boulevard while Maynard was still approximately 100
feet south of the south curb line of that intersection.
(T-134, 143) Cox further observed that the Johnson automobile was traveling slowly and that it didn't travel
more than 6 feet from the time l\Iayna.rd first sounded the
siren until it was struck by the police vehicle. (T-134, 143)
Clearly, the Johnson automobile was in the intersection to be seen.
BUT MAYNARD TESTIFIED THAT HE DIDN'T
SEE THE JOHNSON AUT01IOBILE UNTIL IT \VAS
.JUST 4 FEET IN FRONT OF HIM. (T-53, 363)
14
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We are unable to pereceive how reasonable minds
could conclude that Maynard was ''driving with due regard for the safety of all persons."

(B) Maynard did not sound his siren in time to
reasonably warn Johnson of his approach and
that he was going to enter the intersection
against the red light, a;nd thus was not entitled to the exemptions granted a driver of a;n
emergency vehicle.
Section 41-6-14 grants certain exemptions to the
driver of an emergency vehicle ''only when the driver of
any said vehicle while in motion sounds audible signal by
bell, siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably necessary ... " (Section 41-6-14, supra)
This can only be construed as meaning that the driver
of an emergency vehicle must sound the siren in time so
that other drivers may reasonably be expected to either
stay out of his path or get out of his path. If this is not
done, then the driver of an emergency vehicle is not
granted any exemptions and is required to observe the
same rules and regulations as the drivers of other
vehicles.
Thus, regardless of where Maynard testified that
he was when he first engaged his siren, if he didn't engage it in time to provide ''reasonable'' warning to other
drivers using the highways so that they could either stay
out of his path or get out of his path, then he enjoyed
none of the exemptions granted the drivers of emergency
vehicles by section 41-6-14.

15
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Maynard's testimony is inconsistent with itself in
regard to the siren, and in view of this could not be believed against the overwhelming testimony of disinterested witnesses. Maynard testified that the siren had not
had time to reach maximum intensity between the time
he re-engaged it after shifting gears until the time of the
accident (T-46, 47). He also testified that when here-engaged the siren it would have taken less than the normal
length of time to reach maximum intensity, because the
siren was already sounding and had already ascended
partway toward maximum (T-351).
The siren on the police vehicle was of the fluctuating
type (R. 31). When first engaged it started in a low pitch
and increased in volume to a maximum intensity. Maynard testified on one occasion that it took approxinrately
one second for the siren to reach maximum intensity
( T -31). On another occasion he testified that it took approximately two seconds ( T -34 7, 351). He thus should
have reached the intersection in less than 2 seconds after
he re-engaged the siren.
He also testified that at the point approximately 220
feet south of 27th Street, where he shifted gears, he was
going approximately 30 to 35 miles per hour T-341); that
he increased his speed by approximately two miles per
hour before entering the intersection {T-53), and was
going 37 miles per hour at the time he entered the intersection (T-342).
Lt>Roy G. Bennett, a traffic expert and Police Lieut ('llant on the Ogden City Police Department {T-148, 149),
t(•fd ifh•d that an automobile moving at the rate of 33
16
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miles per hour travels a disance of 51.33 feet in one second, and an automobile traveling 37 miles per hour travels a distance of 54.26 feet in one second.
According to Maynard's testimony he traveled a distance of approximately 220 feet (from the time he shifted
gears and re-engaged the siren until he entered the intersection of the accident) in something less than two seconds (something less than the time necessary for the siren
to reach maximum intensity). Simple mathematics indicates that it is impossible to travel 220 feet in less than
two seconds while moving at a maximum rate of 54.26
feet per second.
Obviously, Maynard was either mistaken as to his
speed, which would have had to be in exceess of 80 miles
per hour (rather than 35-37 miles per hour) or he was
much closer to the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard than he testified he was (220 feet) when
he re-engaged the siren.
In view of the testimony from other disinterested
witnesses, we believe that a properly instructed jury
would have been compelled to find that Maynard did not
re-engage his siren until he was within 100 feet of the intersection; that during the first interval after it was reengaged it was at low intensity and that it did not built
up to an intensity where Mrs. Johnson would have heard
it until an instant before impact. This is further corroborated by Maynard's own voice, which was recorded
on the tape recorder maintained by the Fire Department
T-75, 86). This tape reveals that he was asked to give his
location and he stated "27th and Washington." The tape
17
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shows that he was not sounding the siren as he talked.
The siren sound started on the tape thereafter. The siren
is audible for only a slight second on the tape (Ex. B. T.
79-83, 87-90).
Several persons were stationed in and about the
intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard.
They testified as to how close the police vehicle was to that
intersection when the siren was first audible and as to the
length of time which elapsed from the time the siren was
first audible until the time of impact.
Arthur Cox was standing in Washington Boulevard a measured 100 feet south of the south curb line of
27th Street. His hearing was not impaired by any type
of enclosure. He testified that the siren was first audible
when the police vehicle was approximately 100 feet south
of the intersection and that from tlze time the siren was
first audible until the time of impact the Johnson automobile did not move nwre than six feet. (T-132, 133; Exh.
A, rectangle marked "A. C."; T-134, 143)
Howard Clay, ·who was sitting in a parked car on the
west side of "\V ashington Boulevard 176 feet south of the
south curb line of ~7 Street, testified that the siren was
not andibl e until tl1 (' pol ice 1·eh icl e wa.s 1eiflzin approximately 50 feet of the intersection of :27th Sf reef and Tr a.slziupton Bnulcl'ard, and that the siren had just started at
the time of the rrnsh. (T-11~. 113: Exh. A, rectangle
marked "HC" at south edge of Bakery: T-113, 114, 115)
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Fred Anderson, who was sitting in an automobile
waiting for the "red" light at the intersection of 27th
Street and Washington Boulevard, facing south, testified
tha.t the siren wasn't audible until the police vehicle was
"maybe 20 or 25, maybe 30 feet south of the intersection."
T-116, 117)
Lon Rothy, who was standing at the front door of the
Park & Snack, approximately 300 feet south of the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard and
who had observed the police vehicle as it passed him going
north, testified that the siren was not going when the police vehicle passed him and that when the siren kicked
on it "just seemed to turn about half a revolution, and
then I heard the crash." (Exh. A; T-103, 104, 105)
Mrs. Jerry Brenkman, who was standing at the front
window of the Western Auto Supply Store on the northwest corner of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard,
testified that she glanced up immediately upon hearing
the siren first sound and was just in time to see the accident. She said that the interval between the time the siren
was first audible and the time of the accident was "a second or something." (T-119, 120)
Howard Clay also testified that the Johnson automobile was moving through the intersection going east on
27th Street at a speed of ''not less than 5 miles per hour
but not more than 7 miles per hour."
Police Lieutenant LeRoy G. Bennett, a traffic expert
on the Ogden City Police Department (T-148, 149) testi19
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:tied that, assuming the coefficient of friction for wet
asphalt and the normal reaction time of the average individual, an automobile traveling at a speed of 5 miles per
hour could not stop in less than 6.538 feet, an automobile
traveling 6 miles per hour could not stop in less than 8.092
feet, and an automobile traveling 7 miles per hour could
not stop in less than 9.736 feet.
Officer Bennett was asked to assume the following
facts:
1. That Johnson was traveling at a speed of
from 5 to 7 miles per hour in an easterly
direction on 27th Street.
2. That Johnson first heard the siren at the
time it was first audible to Cox, whose
hearing was unimpaired by any inclosure,
and who testified that the siren was first
audible as it passed him as he was standing in \Y ashington Boulevard 100 feet
south of the south curb line of 27th Street.
(T-132, 133; Exh. A, rectangle marked
"~l.C."; T-134, 143)
3. That from the time the siren was first
audible to Cox until the time of the impact
between the police vehicle and the Johnson automobile, the Johnson automobile
did not move more than 6 feet. (T-134, 143)
4. That the Johnson automobile was struck
b~· the police vehicle on the right front
door post. (T-134, 143)
,\HHU~IING
l~ENNETT

THE ABOYE FACTS, OFFICER
TESTIFIED THAT THERE \VAS NOTH20
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ING JOHNSON COULD HAVE DONE TO A VOID
THE ACCIDENT. (T-166, 167, 168, 169)
We are unable to perceive how reasonable minds
could conclude from this evidence that Maynard gave
audible signal as was reasonable necessary to permit other
drivers either to stay out of his path or to get out of his
path.
There was no affirmative evidence presented which
would in any way indicate that Johnson was contributorily negligent. In this respect we quote the New York
court in the case of Crowley v. Fifth Ave. Coa.ch Co.,
292 N.Y.S. 473, 12 N.E. 2d 175. In that case a fire
truck went through a red light and struck a bus. Evidence showed the siren or fire bell was sounding, but the
bus passengers did not hear it. The court said:
"Bearing in mind the unusual set of circumstances
with which the operator of the bus was confronted
at the time of the collision coupled with the short
space of time that must have elapsed immediately
preceding this accident, we are at a loss to understand how the defendant (bus driver) can be held
responsible in negligence. If 8 of the defendant's
passengers were unable to hear the sound of the
siren or bell, it is fair to assume that the testimony
of the operator was true when he stated that he
did not hear any warning signal. r_fhe accident was
entirely unavoidable, at least in so far as the bus
driver was concerned. As we have seen, the lights
were in his favor, and furthermore, he was operating the bus in a lawful manner immediately prior
to the accident. He, as a careful prudent person
had the right to assume that no vehicle would be
operated against the traffic lights in an easterly
21
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direction on a westbound one-way street.'' (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the nature of her brain injuries Johnson
was unable to recall any of the events leading up to the
accident, or the accident itself. (T-326, 327) In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, it must be
presumed that she was exercising due care for her own
safety. (Tuttle v. P. I. E., 121 Utah 420, 242 P. 2d 764;
Lewis v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97;
Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285; Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, Section 16.8) Certainly, Cox,
who was standing in the open on Washington Boulevard,
didn't hear the siren until the police vehicle was only 100
feet from the intersection (T-132, 133, 134, 135, 145, 146;
Exh. A, rectangle marked "A. C."), and Anderson, who
was seated in an automobile, facing south toward the
approach of the police vehicle, didn't hear the siren until
~Iaynard was ''maybe 20 or 25, maybe 30 feet south of
the intersection.''
We therefore respectfully submit that the trial court
erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the question of liability for the two reasons
discussed:
A. Maynard did not as a rna tter of law keep a proper
lookout.
B. Maynard did not sound his siren in time to reasonably warn Johnson that he was going to enter the intersection against the ''red·' light, and thus he was not
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entitled to any of the exemptions granted by section
41-6-14.
PoiNT

2

THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING, OVER THE
OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 5 AND 6.
Even if the court finds against us and hold there was
evidence for the jury on the question of whether Maynard
was keeping a proper lookout, still the case must be reversed. Certainly where he testified that he did not see
Mrs. Johnson until four feet before impact, the issue of
keeping a proper lookout should at the very least have
been submitted to the jury. But the trial court by Instructions 5 and 6 told the jury that Maynard did not need to
keep a lookout for other cars.
Instruction number 5 of the trial court's instructions
to the jury was as follows :
You are instructed that it is the duty of drivers of
motor vehicles upon the public highways of this
State to at all times exercise due care and diligence in order to prevent damage to vehicles or
injury to persons lawfully upon the highway. Included in this duty to use due care and diligence is
the duty to constantly keep a lookout and to actually see, as well as to look for, all objects and
things which are reasonably within the range of
vision, and which may constitute a hazard. It is
then a further duty after having seen, or after
they should have seen, to use such care and diligence as a reasonable and prudent person, having
due regard to all the conditions of the highway, obstructions, or any other condition which may produce a hazard, would use to prevent damage or
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injury. And in the event that a driver fails or
neglects at any time to exercise such reasonable
care and diligence, he is negligent. However,
under the laws of this state there are certain exceptions to the general rule stated above, and a
consideration of certain of these exceptions apply
to this case, as stated in the following instruction.
This instruction deals with but one subject-to-wit:
the duty to keep a lookout. It tells the jury that generally a
driver of a car must keep a lookout, but it then tells the
jury that there is an exception to this rule. We think that
the Utah law requires the driver of every vehicle to keep a
lookout at all times, and that there is no exception to this
rule. In this regard Instruction No. 5 is wrong. The error
is emphasized by the fact that Instruction No. 6 tries to
state the exception. Instruction 6 tells the jury that if an
emergency vehicle is flashing a light and sounding a. siren,
the driver need not keep a lookout, but only must adjust
if he actually sees and realizes the danger. We contend
this is error, too.
Instruction number 6 discusses the exemptions granted the driver of an emergency vehicle in general terms
by stating as follows:
'' ... The law of this State provides that under certain conditions the driYer of an authorized emergency vehicle shall be exempt from and shall not
be required to observe certain laws that generally
apply to the drivers of vehicles on public streets
or highways. It will be sufficient at this time to
8tate that the laws to which said exemption applies
are those which regulate speed; the obserYance of
signal lights or semaphores; or other traffic control devices; driving on the right-hand side of the
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

highway; or passing on the right side; overtaking
and passing of other vehicles; right-of-way, turns
and signals; stops, standing and parking. It follows that when there exists the conditions which
said statute requires as a basis for said exemption,
it is not negligence for the driver of such emergency vehicle to disregard the rules from which
he is thus exempted unless he is guilty of an arbitrary exercise of the privilege embraced in that
exemption. . . . ''
Subsequently, in the same instruction number 6, the
court states as follows:
" ... An arbitrary exercise of the privileges
given by the aforesaid statute takes place when
and only when the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle does something which would constitute negligence if he did not enjoy the exemption
and when one or both of the two sets of circumstances now to be described also exist :
(1) (This related to vehicles not on an emergency call.)
( 2) After seeing that some other person has
not heard or heeded the warning or seeing that no
one is in charge of property in his path that otherwise might be moved, or seeing that there is no
way in which any other person can reasonably be
expected to prevent a collision, the driver of the
emergency v'ehicle, nevertheless, having both the
means and reasonable opportunity to avoid such a
result, proximately causes an accident producing
injury to another.
The only fair meaning that can be given the language
of instructions 5 and 6 is that the law permits an emergency vehicle, when giving the appropriate audible and
visual signals, to exceed the speed limit, drive on the
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wrong side of the road, disregard traffic signals, rules
of the road regarding right-of-way, passing and turns,
but does not require that the driver look where he is
going, and does not hold him responsible in case of accident unless he has actually seen something he could avoid
and then deliberately runs into it.
The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may
proceed past a ''red'' light at any time, if he may do so
safely. But certainly he at least has the duty to look at the
intersection to determine if it is clear before proceeding.
As a rna tter of fact, if a driver is to be permitted
to disregard usual traffic regulations, to drive at great
speeds, ignore right-of-way provisions, drive on the
wrong side of the street, etc., he should have even a
greater duty to look where he is going than the ordinary
driver, under the familiar rule that the greater the danger the greater the measure of care required. (BAJI
102-A; Klenk v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 27 Utah 428,
76 P. 214; lllallard v. Sims. 173 Wash. 649, 24 P. 2d 70;
Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, section 15.3)
The 1955 amendment to the Utah "Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways'' was adapted from the
''Uniform Motor Vehicle Code,'' the adoption of which
is being urged on all stn tes. ~Iichigan has adopted substantially the same provisions as Utah regarding the
exemptions granted the driYers of emergenc~~ vehicles and
the standard of care required of such drivers. In the case
of City of Kalamazoo Y. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49
N.W. 2d 52, decided September 5, 1951, the l\rfichigan court
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had occasion to decide a case substantially identical to the
present controversy. In its decision the court said:
(Quote taken from the opinion of the court, 49
N.W. 2d 54.)
''Many duties are imposed upon the drivers of
motor vehicles upon public streets and highways.
Some result from express statutory requirements
to observe certain speed limits, to stop for certain
traffic signals and signs, or, under certain circumstances, to yield the right-of-way, violations of
which constitute negligence per se. (citations)
Other duties are inherent in the exercise of that
due care which connotes freedom from negligence
as defined by the courts. Among the latter are the
duties to maintain a reasonable and proper lookout, to see what is plainly there to be seen and
give it due heed, and, before proceeding, from a
suitable observation of conditions then and there
existing to form a reasonable belief that it is safe
to proceed. Failure to perform any of these duties
has been held, under certain circumstances, to
constitute contributory negligence as a matter of
law. (citations) The above quoted statutes, relied
on plaintiff, by their express terms serve to relieve drivers of emergency vehicles only from
those duties imposed on other drivers which relate to observance of speed limits, heeding traffic
signals and stop signs, and the yielding of rightof-way. The language of those statutes contains
not the slightest suggestion of a legislative intent
to excuse such drivers from the other duties mentioned. Had the legislature so intended, it would
have been easy to so provide in express terms. The
very opposite is indicated by the singling out of
speed limits and right-of-way regulations alone
for exemption purposes, and by the requirement in
the selfsame statute that such vehicles must be
driven with due regard for the safety of others.
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''Driving a fire truck into an intersection in full
reliance upon the right to exceed the speed limits
and the right to proceed without stopping for the
stop sign or the through street, but without observing or giving heed to oncoming traffic on the
intersecting through street did not amount to driving with due regard for the safety of others as required by the statute. Such driving in reliance
upon a statutory right-of-way has frequently been
held to constitute contributory negligence as a
matter of law on the part of plaintiff drivers of
private vehicles. (Citations) Inasmuch as the
statute has not relieved drivers of fire trucks from
the same duties to maintain a lookout, to see and
heed what is present to be seen, and, on the basis
of such observation, to form a reasonable belief
that it is safe to proceed, it follows inescapably
that plaintiff's driver must likewise be held to
have been guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, barring plaintiff's right to recovery." (emphasis added)
The Utah statute sets out the exemptions granted
drivers of emergency Yehicles in specific detail. ( 41-6-14,
supra) There is no language in that statute which could
be interpreted as relieving the driver of an emergency
vehicle from keeping a lookout ahead. Drivers exceeding the speed limit, driving on the wrong side of the road,
and ignoring traffic signals certainly have a duty to look
where they are going.
We submit that it was error for the court, over the
objection of plaintiff, to instruct the jury that l\faynard
did not haYe a duty to keep a lookout ahead of the police
vehicle if the red light was flashing and the siren
soundi11g-. Further authority for our position in this regard an' noted under our Point 3.
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PoiNT

3

THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF, THAT THE ONLY MEASURE OF CARE
REQUIRED OF THE DRIVER OF AN AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLE WAS TO
GIVE REASONABLE WARNING OF HIS APPROACH. (Instruction No.6)

Because Instruction No. 6 is rather long, we will not
set it forth in full in our brief. Material parts of it have
already been quoted above. The instruction taken as a
whole tells the jury that the only measure of care required by the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
is to give reasonable warning of his approach and to
adjust to things he actually sees and as to which he actually realizes the danger. Instructions 5 and 6 tell the jury
that if an adequate warning is being given, there is an
exception to the duty to keep a proper lookout (as noted
above under Point 2) and from all other duty of care. This
is contrary to the holding of our Utah Supreme Court in
Jensenv. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196,271 P. 2nd 838, where the
Supreme Court held that the exemptions granted to the
driver of an emergency vehicle do not excuse him from
exercising due care.
It is true that our law on emergency vehicles was as
noted above amended in 1955, but the amendments were
not made for the purpose of changing this rule. The
emergency vehicle is granted specific exemptions and by
negative implication, it is required to obey all others. This
is recognized by the instruction on emergency vehicles
contained in the Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, pre29
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pared and edited by Mr. Justice J. Allen Crockett. See
Instruction 25.1, subdivision two.
There is a line of California cases which have followed the doctrine of the trial court's instruction. Raynor
v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P.1054, 1057.
We have been unable to find any other state which
has adopted the California doctrine.
Clearly the Utah Legislature did not intend that the
sole measure of care of the driver of an emergency vehicle be whether or not he had given reasonable warning.
This Court, in the case of J en.sen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d
196, 271 P. 2d 838, decided June 11, 1954, so held. It considered and rejected the California doctrine. We quote
from the opinion of the court (2 Utah 2d 200):
''Defendant cites and relies on a line of California
cases, construing statutes different from ours,
which reach a result not possible under our statute, and which in our opinion would do violence
to the legislative intent expressed therein. It may
well be that the results which defendant contends
for would be in the public interest, but that is
something which the legislature and not this court
must consider.
''In the final analysis, defendant contends that due
regard for the safetr of others, required by Section 41-6-14, is satisfied if the driver of an emergeney vehicle has giYen the warning by siren and
by light. In fact, the defendant contends that this
court should adopt the Yiew expressed by the California court in two cases where it uses the following language :
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' ... The statutes are clear that when an audible signal is given the operator of the emergency vehicle has a clear right of way. The
giving of the signal is the measure of care on
his part, and if this is done his duty of care
is performed.... ' (Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 75 P. 2d 599, 604) ' ...
The provisions in sections 120 and 132, supra,
to the effect that the exemptions there given
shall not relieve the driver of an emergency
vehicle of the duty to drive with due regard
to the safety of the public means that the
driver must, 'by suitable warning, give others
a reasonable opportunity to yield the right
of way.' (Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10
Cal. 2d 476, 75 P. 2d 599, 603) The sections
also provide that the exemption shall not protect the driver from 'an arbitrary exercise' of
the privileges there granted. But an arbitrary exercise of said privileges cannot be
predicated upon th elements of speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where a
warning has been given. 'In such cases speed,
right of way, and all other 'rules of the road'
are out of the picture.' (Rancor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P. 2d 1054, 1957)
"(2) The Utah Legislature by its amendment of
the Statute in 1949 provided limitations on the exemptions given firemen answering a call by authorizing the emergency vehicle to proceed past
a red stop light only when a red light is burning on
the vehicle and the siren sounding.
''The privilege was further conditioned by allowing such operator to proceed past a red stop light
'only after slowing down as may be necessary for
safe operation.'
"The Legislature likewise added this (J)dditional
limitation on the exercise of the privilege granted:
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'' 'The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of
all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the
driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.'
''To adopt the view contended for by defendant
would ignore completely the specific limitations
placed by the Legislature on the driver of an emergency vehicle.'' (emphasis added)
See also Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Hall Funeral Home,
68 So. 2d 626; Ruth v. Rhodes, 185 P. 2d 304 (Ariz.).
We again quote from the case of City of Kalamazoo v.
Priest, supra:
''The above quoted statutes relied on by plaintiff,
by their express terms serve to relieve drivers of
emergency vehicles only from those duties imposed on other drivers which relate to observance
of speed limits, heeding traffic signals and stop
signs, and the yielding of right-of-way. The language of those statutes contains not the slightest
suggestion of a legislath·e intent to excuse such
drivers from the other duties mentioned. Had
the legislature so iuteuded, it zrould have been
easy tn so provide in express terms. The very
opposite intent is indicated by the singling out of
speed limits and right-of-way regulations alone
for e.TC'mption purposes, and by the requirement
in the selfsame statute that such vehicles must
be drirC'n U.'ith due regard for the safety of
others.'' (emphasis added)
It is clear that the Utah Legislature did not intend
that the sole mcasun' of rare required of the driYer of an
emerg-t>TH'Y \'ehicle should be whether or not a reasonable
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warning was given. The driver of an emergency vehicle
cannot be permitted to drive "pell mell" through a business district of a city without regard for other motorists
or pedestrians or for any and all traffic regulations just
because he has a siren and a red light.
Therefore, we respectfully submit that the trial court
committed error in giving its instruction numer six to
the jury, over the objection of plaintiff.
POINT

4

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NUMBERS.

Plaintiffs
follows:

requested an instruction reading as

''The amount of caution used by the ordinary prudent person varies in direct proportion to the danger known to be involved in his undertaking. It
follows that in the exercise of ordinary care, the
amount of caution required by the law increases,
as does the danger that reasonably should be
anticipated.''
That this is a correct principal of law seems beyond
dispute.
The compilers of the Jury Instruction Forms, Utah,
cite two cases for this very principal of law, Klenk v.
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 27 Utah 428, 76 P. 214 and
Mallard v. Sims, 173 Wash. 649, 24 P. 2d 70. The Klenk
case holds that "negligence is the want of care required
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by the circumstances.'' The Mallard case holds that ''negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances. ''
In accordance with this principal of law, the compilors of the aforementioned Jury Instruction forms set
out the following instruction (section 15.3):
"Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the
ordinary prudent person varies in direct proportion to the danger known to be involved in his
undertaking, it follows that in the exercise of
ordinary care, the amount of caution required will
vary in accordance with the nature of the act and
the surrounding circumstances. (To put the matter in another way, the amount of caution required
by the law increases, as does the danger that reasonably should be apprehended.)
We submit that both plaintiff's requested instruction
number 8 and Section 15.3 of the Jury Instruction Forms,
Utah, correctly enunciate the law.
We further submit that according to :Maynard's own
testimony he was driving his police vehicle on a rainy
day, when the streets were wet, when hearing and visibility would be somewhat impaired ( T-28, 29, 42, 51, 72,
112) in the business district of Ogden City (T-32) during
a rush hour (T-72); that whatever the standard of care
required of the driver of an emergency vehicle, he should
be required to use more care under such circumstances
than if he were driving on a country road on a clear day
with no other traffic in the vicinity; and that plaintiff was
entitled to have the jury so instructed.
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POINT

5

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 11.
Plaintiff's requested instruction number 11 reads
as follows:
"You are instructed that plaintiff, Amy P. Johnson, had the right to presume that no vehicle would
be operated against the red traffic control light at
the intersection of Washington Blvd. and 27th
Street, and that she was not required to anticipate the presence of the police vehicle being driven
by the defendant, William T. Maynard, and give it
the right of way, unless she knew, or in the exercis eof ordinary care, should havee known that
such a vehicle was approaching.''
In this regard, the authors of the Jury Instruction
Forms, Utah, stated the following proposition of law in
section 16.12 of that work.
''A person who is exercising due care has a right
to assume that others will also perform their
duties under the law, and he has a right to rely and
act on that assumption unless, in the exercise of
reasonable care, he observes or should observe
something to warn him to the contrary. In the absence of any such warning, it is not negligence for
a person to fail to anticipate injury which can
come to him only from a violation of law or duty
by another."
The case of Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176
P. 267, is cited as authority for the above proposition.
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Furthermore, section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated,
provides that the exemptions therein granted to the drivers of emergency vehicles are privileged only under the
following conditions:
( 2) Said exemption herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when
the driver of any said vehicle while in motion
sounds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust
whistle as may be reasonably necessary ...

That section of the Utah code can only be interpreted as meaning that the driver of an emergency vehicle does not enjoy any of the privileges set forth in
41-6-14 unless he sounds his siren so as to give other
drivers reasonable opportunity either to stay out of his
path or to get out of his path.
Even California, which practically gives Carte
Blanche to the driver of an emergency vehicle, recognizes
this principal. In the case of Balthasar v. Pac. El. Ky.
Co., 202 P. 37, 19 A.L.R. 452, the California court states
as follows:
''Notice to the person required to yield the right
of way is essential, and a reasonable opportunity
to stop or otherwise yield the right of way necessary in order to charge a person with the obligation
fixed hr law to giYe precedence to the fire
apparatus.''
And in the ense of Rogers Y. City of Los Angeles, 44
P. 2d 465, when' an ambulance went through a red light
and struck the plaintiff's coupe, the California court said:
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''Unless she knew or in the exercise of ordinary
care should have known that the ambulance was
approaching, the plaintiff driving the coupe was
under no obligation to anticipate its presence."
Therefore, we respectfully submit that the court
committed error in refusing to give plaintiff's requested
instruction number 11. That said instruction correctly
enunciated the law, and that plaintiff was entitled to have
the jury consider it under the facts of this case.

POINT

6

THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON "UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT,"
OVER THE· OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF.
(a) There was no evidence presented in the case

upon which a jury could base a verdict of'' unavoidable accident.''

It is the undisputed evidence in this case that Maynard was driving an emergency vehicle in a northerly direction on Washington Boulevard approaching the intersection of 27th Street. (R-1; T-43, 49) That the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard was in
the business district of Ogden, and that it was a rush
hour. (T-32, 33, 72) That it was raining, windows were
closed and hearing and visibility were restricted.
(T-28, 29, 51, 72) That the light at 27th Street and
Washington Boulevard was ''red'' against Maynard,
and that he had known it would be "red" against him
since crossing the intersection of 28th Street a11d Washington Boulevard, a block to the south. (T-341, 354, 358,
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359, 363) That sometime before entering the intersettion of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard Maynard
engaged the siren. ( T -341, 350) That approximately
220 feet south of the intersection he commenced to accelerate and continued to accelerate into the intersection
and up to the point of impact. (T-53) ) That Maynard entered the intersection against the "red" light. (T-136)
And that he didn't see the Johnson automobile until he
was just 4 feet short of striking it (T-53, 363), although it
had been in the intersection for some time and other
witnesses had no trouble seeing it. (T-112, 113, 114,
134, 143)
Based on that evidence, the trial court gave the following instruction (over the objection of plaintiff):
"No. 8. In law we recognize what is termed an
unavoidable or inevitable accident. These terms
do not mean literally that it was not possible for
such an accident to be avoided. They simply denote an accident that occurred without having
been proximately caused by negligence.
''Even if such an accident could ha\e been avoided
by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill or
caution, still, no one may be held liable for injuries
resulting from it.
''Even if such an accident could ha\e been avoided
hr the use of greater foresight. caution or skill
than was required in the circumstances in the exercise of ordinary rare. still, no one may be held
liable for injuries resulting from it.
""\VhPthPr or not the accident in question in this
rasP was mwYoida.ble is, of course, a question of
fact for you to determine; and in giving the fore-

38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

going instruction I do not imply any opinion or
suggestion as to what your finding should be.''
The cases are uniform to the effect that it is error
to instruct on the doctrine of unavoidable accidents in
the absence of affirmative evidence to show that the accident was in fact unavoidable. The instruction may not
be given where the evidence leaves it to conjecture or
surmise. In an ordinary case where, as here, plaintiff
charges negligence and the defendant enters a general
denial and charges contributory negligence, an instruction
on unavoidable accidents is not proper. The cases and
text writers are uniform in this holding.
See for example, Rabe v. Lee (Texas), 239 S.W. 2d
846, where the court said :
''Appellants first contend the trial court erred
in not submitting the issue of unavoidable accident. This collision occurred just north of the City
of Edinburg on Highway 281 in Hidalgo County.
Mrs. Lee was driving north on Highway 281, while
Mrs. Rabe was proceeding south along said highway, and she testified that she was on her righthand side of the highway, or the west side of same,
at the time of the collision. There was evidence
tending to show that the collision occurred on the
east or wrong side of the highway viewed from the
standpoint of Mrs. Rabe. Appellants base their
contention that unavoidable accident was in the
case upon this statement: 'The jury could have
readily believed from the evidence that the two
cars, at about dusk, were engaged in passing other
cars; that neither driver was negligent in attempting to pass, not having observed that the other car
was attempting to pass; and the question present39
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ed to this court is one of a two-lane highway with
two cars approaching from either direction, filling
the highway on both sides, and with this hypothesis in view the jury could have very well found the
accident unavoidable.' We overrule this contention. Under the circumstances described by appellants, either one or both of the drivers of the two
cars would be guilty of negligence. Under the evidence offered by appellee, the collision occurred
on the east half of the highway when the car driven
by Mrs. Ra be suddenly left the west half of the
highway and ran into the car being driven by Mrs.
Lee on her own proper side of the highway and at
a moderate rate of speed. Mrs. Rabe testified that
the collision occurred on her right side of the road,
that is on the west side. All of the evidence tended to show one or the other driver guilty of negligence. There was no evidence that the act of a
third person or something other than the negligence of the drivers of the two cars caused the collision. Under such circumstances the question of
unavoidable accident is not in the case.
There are numerous cases from many jurisdictions
holding in accordance with this \ie-w. The matter is rather
elaborately discussed in Williams Y. Burrell, (Ohio) 182
NE 889, where emphasis is given to the fact that a lay
jury is giYen ''an easy way out'' by such an instruction,
and unless it is used ·with great caution, it is apt to be
highly prejudicial.

4J5,

In Joh1NW11, v. 1Uacias, (5th Circuit) 193 F. 2d
the court noted that it would be improper to gi\e an inRtruction on an uiwYoidable accident unless there was
affirmativl' t'\·idence tending to show that plaintiff's injuries rt>Rulted from some cause other than negligence on the
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part of someone. To like effect are the following cases :
Heuy v. Stephens, 275 P. 2d 254; Seele v. Parcell, (New
Mexico) i1'3 P. 2d 320; Rowton v. Kemp, (Okla.) 125 P.
2d 1003.
The rule is noted in Blash:field, Cyclopedia of Automobile and Practice, Vol. 10 C, Section 6698. It is there
noted:
''A party is not entitled to an instruction on
the theory of an unavoidable accident, in the absence of any evidence on which to base it, or upon
pleadings not raising the issue, such as where both
parties charge negligence in their pleadings. Also,
where the accident could not have happened without negligence or contributory negligence, it is
error to instruct as to an unavoidable accident.''
Cases from numerous jurisdictions are cited in support of the rule.
There is no evidence in the present case to show that
either car involved was impeded or influenced by any
mechanical failure, obstruction, or extraneous force, or
that it resulted from some condition or act for which the
defendant was not chargeable, or that it resulted from
some unknown and wholly conjectural cause, or in some
manner that cannot be explained.
If the jury were to :find that Johnson's injuries were
the result of an unavoidable accident its findings could
have been supported by nothing stronger than surmise or
suspicion.
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1111

Adopting the language of the Ohio court in the case
of Williams v. Burrell, supra, "We believe, also, that a
charge on the subject of unavoidable accident should be
used with great care and discretion, for the reason that
in the minds of the lay jury, unfamiliar with the legal
definition of unavoidable accident, and familiar only with
the layman's theory of what accidents are, in the sense
understood by the layman, it furnishes an easy way out
for a jury to find for the defendant, losing sight of the
real issues of the case as to whether or not there has been
negligence, and whether or not the negligence was the
proximate cause of the damages sustained.''
We therefore respectfully submit that the court committed error in instructing the jury in this case on "unavoidable accident.''
(b) No issue of "unavoidable accident" was
raised by the pleadings, or otherwise.

There is authority both ways on the question of
whether or not the defense of "unavoidable accident"
must be specially pleaded, even though there might be endence on which such a charge might be based. We believe
the weight of authority, as well as the better rule, is to the
effect that it must be specially pleaded.
We repeat here part of the quote from Blashfield,
Cyclopedia of Automobile and Pra('tice, Vol. 10 C, Section
6698, whirh was quoted in the previous section:
''A party is not entitled to an instruction on the
theory of an umn?oilable arrident, in the absence
of any evidence on whirh to base it, OR UPON
42
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PLEADINGS NOT RAISING THE ISSUE,
SUCH AS WHERE BOTH PARTIES CHARGE
NEGLIGENCE IN THEIR PLEADINGS. (note
32, reproduced below) (emphasis added)
Cal.

Fraser v. Stellinger, 126 P. 2d 653, 52 Cal.
App. 2d 564.

Ga.

Harper v. Hall, 46 S.E. 2d 201, 76 Ga. App.
441.
Ault v. Whittemore, 35 S.E. 2d 526, 73 Ga.
App. 10.

Ohio. Avra v. Karshner, 168 N.E. 237, 32 Ohio
492.
Tex.

Southland Greyhound Lines v. Denrnison,
Civ. App., 62 S.W. 2d 500."

In the present case the pleadings did not raise the
issue of "unavoidable accident." Johnson alleged that
she was injured due to the negligence of Maynard.
Maynard denied that he was negligent, and alleged that
Johnson was injured due to her own negligence. Maynard further alleged that if he was negligence, that Johnson assumed the risk of attempting to cross the intersection of 27th and Washington in front of the police
vehicle. (T-1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 16)
The issue of "unavoidable accident' 'was not mentioned during the trial and no evidence was presented on
it. That issue did not enter the trial until the jury was
instructed by the court.
We therefore respectfully submit that the instruction on "unavoidable accident" was error for the <Hldi43
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tional reason that there was no issue formulated by the
pleadings, or otherwise, on which such an instruction
could be based.
PoiNT

7

THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF, ON THE DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMPTION OF RISK."

In its instruction number 7 to the jury the court instructed on the doctrine of ''assumption of risk.''
The doctrine of ''assumption of risk,'' in its primary or usual meaning, is limited to controversies between master and servant and is not applicable in the
absence of any contractual relation between the parties.
(see: 65 C.J.S. 848)
The doctrine has been extended somewhat, but we
have been unable to find a reported case in which the doctrine has been held applicable, or has even been considered, in a collision case, with the exception of ''guest''
cases, where the guest has been held to have assumed the
risk of riding with the driYer or in a defective automobile, etc.
Corpus Juris Secundum sets forth the well-known
conditions which must exist before the doctrine of "assumption of risk'' may be applied. We quote from that
work, 65 C.J.S. 851, 852, 853:
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"Voluntary character of exposure to risk. In order to invoke the rule of assumed or incurred risk,
it is essential that plaintiff, who exposed himself
or his property to danger, or who continued so to
expose himself or his property, shall have done so
voluntarily. The doctrine, accordingly, can apply
only where a person may reasonably elect whether
or not he shall expose himself to a particular danger; and it has no application where a continued
exposure to risk is due to a lack of reasonable
opportunity to escape after the danger is appreciated ... "
''Knowledge and appreciation of danger. Also in
order to invoke the doctrine of assumed or incurred risk, it is essential that the risk or danger
shall have been known to, and appreciated by,
plaintiff, or that it shall have been so obvious that
he must be taken to have known and comprehended
it.... And one is not required to anticipate that
he will be exposed to a hazard not naturally incidental to his situation, but arising from negligence which he has no reason to foresee."
''The application of the doctrine of assumed or incurred risk has been adjudicated with respect to
various facts and circumstances, as where plaintiff participated in a dangerous sport, or joined a
crowd of spectators knowing that they were likely
to become unruly, or submitted to beauty shop
treatments, etc.''
This court has fairly recently considered the doctrine of "assumption of risk" in the case of Wold v.
Ogden City, 258 P. 2d 453. In that case this court stated
as follows:
''Plaintiff also is precluded, having assumed the
risk of injury under the circumstances of this case.
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We emphasize the fact that he knew of the hazard
at 4 p.m. arnd at 2:30 a.m. when he 'looked this situation over.' The doctrine of assumption of risk,
originally applicable to employer-employee relations, has been extended to some situations where
one knows of a condition and concludes to accept
its attendant hazards and acts accordingly without force of necessity.'' (emphasis added)
The Wold case involved an open ditch, and this court
held that plaintiff had assumed the risk of trying to step
over it, when he had ''looked this situation over.'' The
opinion of the court also cited various examples of "assumption of risk.'' The examples given are ''slipping on
ice'' and ''falling through unguarded openings.''
It is submitted that the doctrine of ''assumption of
risk'' is not applicable to this case, and further, that if it
were applicable to an intersection collision, no evidence
appears in the record on which the court could justify an
instruction embodying its doctrine. There is no evidence
that Johnson had "looked this situation over," that she
knew and appreciated the danger she was incurring and
deliberately elected to incur the known danger. Thus,
eveh if the doctrine were applicable, the court erred in so
instructing the jury in the absence of any evidence whatsoever on which the jury could determine that Johnson
had in fart ''assumed the risk.''
PorNT 8

THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF AN "ACT OF GOD."
46
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(a) The instruction on the applicability of the doctrine of am" Act of God" was given without
in amy way defining that doctrine. (R-393)

After the jury had retired to deliberate, the trial
judge was called to the jury room and according to an
affidavit filed by the judge, one of the jurors asked him:
"Does an 'Act of God' apply in this case~" The trial
judge "informed this juror and the rest of the jury that
that doctrine had no application whatever in this case,
and must not be considered by them in their deliberations.'' (R-393)
This question certainly suggests that the jury was
puzzled concerning the instruction on unavoidable accident. The trial judge, according to his affidavit, told the
jury that the doctrine of ''an act of God'' did not apply.
However, the Judge gave no guidance to the jury whatever. He did not tell them what was the difference between ''an act of God'' and ''an unavoidable accident.''
Usually an unavoidable accident will be an act of God.
For the Judge to tell the jury in one instruction that they
may find this to be an unavoidable accident, and then in
answer to their inquiry tell them that they were not to
consider the doctrine of ''an act of God'' without distinguishing between these doctrines or defining them, certainly would leave the jury confused.
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the former
section 104-24-14, deals with instructions to juries. Under
the former section this court held, in the case of Smith v.
Ca;n;naday, 45 U. 521, 529, 147 P. 210, that the trial court
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does not discharge its duty by giving the jury mere lexical and cyclopedic definitions, and mere abstract propositions of law. How much less does the trial court discharge
its duty of instructing the jury by merely referring to the
title of a doctrine without even giving a lexical or cyclopedic definition thereof~
We submit that it was error to instruct the jury on
the applicability or non-applicability of any doctrine without first defining for the jury that doctrine, and that because of the apparent confusion of the jury this instruction must be presumed to have been prejudicial to the
plaintiff.
(b) The instruction on the applicability of the doctrine of an "Act of God" was given in the
jury room, after the jury had retired for deliberation, without the presence of counsel, or
either party, or notice to counsel, and said instruction was not given in 1criting and was not
taken dotcn by the reporter. (R-303)

Rule 47 (n), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as
follows:
(n) Additional Instructions. After the jury have
retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement
among them as to any· part of the testimony, or if
1ht>~· desire to be informed on any point of law
arising in the cause, the~· may require the officer
to conduct them into court. Upon their being
brought into court the information required must
lw g-i ,·en in the presence of, or after notice to, the
parties or counsel. Such information must be in
writing or taken down hy the reporter.
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The author, in 39 American Jurisprudence, section
102, page 116, 117, has collected authorities on this subject. We quote from that section:
''Most courts, however, take the position that if
the judge enters the jury room in the absence of
the attorneys, even at the request of the jurors,
after they have retired to deliberate on their verdict, and has any communication or conversation
with the jury in reference to the case, a new trial
will be granted, without consideration of the question whether such conversation was prejudicial or
not (citing authority); and the same is true if additional instructions or other communications are
sent to the jury room without the consent of, or
notice to, parties or counsel. (citing authorities)
In many cases it is said that injury in such cases
will be presumed (citing authorities), and authority is not wanting to the effect that this presumption is conclusive. (citing authorities) Even where
a trial judge enters the jury room at the request of
the jurors, after they have retired to deliberate on
their verdict, and communicate or converse with
the jury in reference to the case, in the absence of
attorneys (citing authorities), or sends additional
instructions to the jury room in response to questions of the jury (citing authorities), the verdict
should be set aside and a new trial granted. The
trial judge should not under any circumstances
enter the jury room, however innocent and proper
his purpose emay be. (citing authorities) ... "

"In some states it is provided by statute how
and under what circumstarnces a trial judge may
communicate with the jury, and amy communication which is not in substantial compliance with
the statutory provisions is ground for a new trial.
(citing authorities) (emphasis added)
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In the instant case the jurors were not conducted into
court, the judge entered the jury room. Counsel were
not present and were not notified. The instruction was not
given in writing and was not taken down by the reporter.
{R-393) We submit that this was prejudicial error and
adopt the language of the court of the court in the case
of Jenss et al. v. Harrod, 166 N.Y.S. 958, where the court
said:
"The probity and fairness of the ... judge here
is well known; he undoubtedly entered the jury
room with the best of motives; but ... as to what
he said, will not be inquired into, if he entered
the jury room without the consent of the complaining parties; for we have to depend upon his recollection as to what occurred, and that might not be
accurate; he may not have clearly expressed his
own meaning, or the jurors may have misunderstood him and in afterwards relating what occurred an unintentional alteration of words might
entirely change the meaning. Unless waived, a
party should have an opportunity to consider the
language and effect of any communication of a
judge to a jury.'' (see also annotations in: 22
A.L.R. 261; 34 A.L.R. 104; 62 A.L.R. 1468; 84
A.L.R. 230; 66 C.J.S. 58(g).)
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & :\IECHA:\1
Attorneys for Appellan.t
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